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Information theoryThe adoption of ITs by medical organisations makes possible the compilation of large amounts of health-
care data, which are quite often needed to be released to third parties for research or business purposes.
Many of this data are of sensitive nature, because they may include patient-related documents such as
electronic healthcare records. In order to protect the privacy of individuals, several legislations on health-
care data management, which state the kind of information that should be protected, have been deﬁned.
Traditionally, to meet with current legislations, a manual redaction process is applied to patient-related
documents in order to remove or black-out sensitive terms. This process is costly and time-consuming
and has the undesired side effect of severely reducing the utility of the released content. Automatic meth-
ods available in the literature usually propose ad-hoc solutions that are limited to protect speciﬁc types of
structured information (e.g. e-mail addresses, social security numbers, etc.); as a result, they are hardly
applicable to the sensitive entities stated in current regulations that do not present those structural reg-
ularities (e.g. diseases, symptoms, treatments, etc.). To tackle these limitations, in this paper we propose
an automatic sanitisation method for textual medical documents (e.g. electronic healthcare records) that
is able to protect, regardless of their structure, sensitive entities (e.g. diseases) and also those semanti-
cally related terms (e.g. symptoms) that may disclose the former ones. Contrary to redaction schemes
based on term removal, our approach improves the utility of the protected output by replacing sensitive
terms with appropriate generalisations retrieved from several medical and general-purpose knowledge
bases. Experiments conducted on highly sensitive documents and in coherency with current regulations
on healthcare data privacy show promising results in terms of the practical privacy and utility of the
protected output.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
New technologies have played a crucial role on improving
healthcare delivery. Data digitalisation, in particular, has paved
the way for the extensive adoption of Electronic Health Records
(EHR) systems that have enabled clinicians and researchers to
access, manage and exploit large amounts of valuable patient data
easily [23]. Nevertheless, as data becomes more accessible and eas-
ily copied and transferred, the conﬁdentiality of the patients is
more likely to be jeopardised.
Redaction is a privacy-preserving method that aims to avoid (or
at least mitigate) the disclosure of raw conﬁdential data, such as
textual documents (in contrast with speciﬁc privacy protection
methods focusing only on relational databases [12,22]). Redaction
is based on blacking-out, obscuring or eliminating sensitive termsin the documents prior to their release. Selecting which elements
of the document have to be redacted is crucial, because a weak
redaction process may disclose sensitive data. On the other hand,
a too restrictive redaction may destroy the utility of the document,
a situation that goes against the purpose of data releasing.
Ofﬁcial regulations have been developed at this respect within
the medical context. For example, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [11], states safe harbour rules
about the kind of personally identiﬁable information which should
be removed in medical documents prior allowing their publication.
More speciﬁcally, the HIPAA requires 18 data elements (called PHI:
Protected Health Information) to be removed from a redacted
document. The goal of such regulation is to maintain individual’s
anonymitywhile preserving healthcare outcomes, which are useful
for medical research, intact.
In other scenarios, such as when medical records are released to
insurance companies or legal counsel [34] to be used as a support
for legal claims (e.g. workers’ compensation claims and motor
vehicle accident claims), privacy protection regulations are focused
towards ensuring the conﬁdentiality of individual’s data. In those
1 http://www.dmoz.org (last accessed: November, 2013).
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mation that may impair her dignity and/or be the cause of discrim-
ination must be removed. Regarding this last point, many US state
and federal laws stipulate that elements such as HIV status, drug or
alcohol abuse and mental health conditions must be redacted
before releasing medical records to third parties [10,20,37].
The main side effect of document redaction is that it signiﬁ-
cantly reduces the utility of the protected content [8]. Another
important drawback is that the existence of obscured or blacked-
out parts can raise the awareness of the document’s sensitivity in
front of potential attackers [4]. This is especially problematic in
documents linked to a speciﬁc knowledge area such as healthcare,
because the number of different textual elements that usually
appear on the documents is relatively limited. Therefore, leaving
blacked-out parts increases the probabilities for an attacker to
determine the redacted terms by means of some characteristics
such as their context and their length [21]. A more suitable alterna-
tive to document redaction consists on generalising sensitive
content instead of removing it, a measure that preserves more con-
tent utility [8]. This is usually referred to as document sanitisation
[4]. As a result of content generalisation a less detailed but still
useful document is obtained, while no explicit clues about the
document’s sensitivity are given.
In any case, document redaction/sanitisation is signiﬁcantly
hindered by the need to deal with textual data and because of
the existence of semantic relationships between the textual terms
in the document. The fact that many sensitive terms lack a regular
structure (e.g. disease names, in contrast to e-mail addresses or
social security numbers) limits the effectiveness of automatic
methods based on pattern matching or trained classiﬁers [23].
Semantic relationships, on the other hand, may enable the
re-identiﬁcation of redacted/sanitised elements from the presence
of related terms left in clear form. For example, let us consider
the following text in which the sensitive term AIDS has been
redacted (i.e. replaced by XXX).
‘‘The patient suffers from XXX that was transmitted because of an
unprotected sexual intercourse. He was diagnosed when his
immune system responded poorly to inﬂuenza.’’
Even though the terms left in clear form ‘‘unprotected sexual
intercourse’’, ‘‘immune system’’ or ‘‘inﬂuenza’’ may seem appar-
ently innocuous, an external observer with a certain knowledge
on the domain [7] may effectively re-identify the redacted term
AIDS by semantic inference; for example, by simply querying the
three terms in a Web search engine, most of the resulting web
pages are related to AIDS/HIV.
Providing privacy protection against an external observer who
exploits semantic inferences to re-identify redacted/sanitised ele-
ments is a quite challenging task. According to [34], with the help
of a Web search engine, an external observer can easily infer facts,
reconstruct events and piece together identities from fragments of
information collected from different sources. This situation is
assumed to be even worse when dealing with medical records,
whose tight focus would result quite commonly in the presence
of strong relationships between the different elements (diseases,
symptoms, treatments, medication, etc.).
Due to the above problems, redaction/sanitisation of medical
documents is usually performed in a manual way by a human
expert (or a team of human experts), who follows regulations
and redaction guidelines detailing the correct procedures to sani-
tise sensitive entities [24]. This task has proven to be burdensome,
very time-consuming [16] and prone to disclosure risks [6]. For
example, the authors in [4] interviewed the medical records man-
ager for a 10,000+ patient healthcare provider in California, who
stated that the act of redacting records takes approximately 20%
of her time while the remaining 80% is consumed by the moredifﬁcult task of deciding what to redact. In order to deal with
textual terms and their potential semantic relationships, this
expert maintains lists of names of medications, treatments,
etc., which are related to sensitive diseases to be protected, such
as HIV.
Given the burden of manual document redaction/sanitisation,
the development of automatic schemes capable of dealingwith tex-
tual healthcare data and avoiding the disclosure caused by seman-
tic inference while retaining the utility of the output document, is a
clear need for medical organisations. Unfortunately, as it will be
discussed in Section 2, methods available in the literature are
limited and they only partially cover some of those features.
1.1. Contributions and plan
In this paper, we describe an automatic scheme designed to san-
itise textual medical documents (e.g. electronic healthcare records)
without assuming any kind of structural regularity in the entities
to protect. Moreover, it puts special emphasis in the detection
and sanitisation of terms that are semantically related to sensitive
entities, in order to avoid disclosure via semantic inference. The
present work offers the following contributions:
 It applies an information theoretic notion of term sensitivity
[30] to develop a sanitisation method for textual medical data,
which is well-suited to fulﬁl with the privacy requirements sta-
ted by the current legislations on healthcare data protection.
 It applies and extends the notion of disclosure risk introduced in
[31,32] to detect risky semantically related terms. Moreover, it
exploits several general-purpose (WordNet [14] and ODP1) and
healthcare (SNOMED-CT [33]) knowledge bases to preserve data
utility.
 It proposes a more accurate way of computing term disclosure
risk using the Web as corpora and a knowledge base to mini-
mise semantic ambiguity.
 The proposed scheme is evaluated and compared against
related works using documents describing highly sensitive
medical concepts and realistic use cases based on existing reg-
ulations on medical data privacy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews
related works in document redaction/sanitisation. Section 3 pre-
sents our proposal. Section 4 details the evaluation metrics and
compares the results obtained for a collection of highly sensitive
documents against previous works. The ﬁnal section provides the
conclusions.2. Related work
As explained in the introduction, depending on the privacy
requirements, protection of healthcare documents may pursue
two different goals: (i) preserve the individual’s anonymity; or (ii)
ensure the conﬁdentiality of her data. For the ﬁrst case, the HIPAA
rules [11] specify which identifying elements should not appear
in any protected medical document in order to avoid re-identiﬁca-
tion. Regarding the second case, governmental legislations stipu-
late [10,20,37,38] which sensitive elements should be masked
from any medical record (to avoid potential discrimination) before
releasing it to a third party.
Most of the literature on the sanitisation/redaction related the
medical domain focus on identifying terms. In a recent survey of
redacting methods for electronic health records [23], all the 18
reviewed schemes focused on protecting those identifying
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dates, social security numbers, etc.). A relevant characteristic of
HIPAA elements is that they tend to present a regular structure
(e.g. numbers of a certain length, dates, e-mails, etc.) or can take val-
ues fromaﬁnite set (e.g. locations). Thus, redaction schemes focused
on these elements exploit these regularities to detect them in an
automatic way. Because of this, as stated by the survey, they can
be classiﬁed into schemes based on machine learning (e.g.
[2,17,19,36,41]), which train classiﬁers to detect speciﬁc types of
elements, and those based on pattern matching, which rely on the
manualdeﬁnitionof regular expressions (e.g. [3,13,15,18,25,35,40]).
Because of their inherent design, the above systems can hardly
support other kind of sensitive elements, especially in those cases
in which no regular structure can be exploited. In fact, most sensi-
tive elements related to patient’s conﬁdentiality, such as names of
diseases, do not have a regular structure. In such cases, the disclo-
sure risk is a function of their inherent semantics (i.e. the fact that
they refer to a speciﬁc and sensitive matter), rather than of their
type [7]; for example, diseases such as ﬂu and AIDS in a medical
record may appear to be mere plain words, but the latter is highly
sensitive because of being potentially discriminatory [10,20,37]:
AIDS has traditionally entailed social discrimination because of
its usual transmission mechanism (which is related to sexual
habits) and severity. Moreover, because of the lack of a proper
semantic analysis, the above approaches cannot detect the
existence of apparently innocuous terms (e.g. symptoms, treat-
ments) that may re-identify a sensitive one by means of semantic
inference, thus negating the redaction process.
Approaches that consider term semantics during document
redaction/sanitisation are mainly manual. In [4,16] it is discussed
the implications of a manual redaction process performed by an
expert on the healthcare ﬁeld (i.e. the medical records manager
in a Hospital). In order to detect sensitive terms and risky semantic
relationships, this expert uses her own knowledge on the ﬁeld
together with long lists of names of diseases, treatments, etc.,
which are also manually compiled and maintained. This results
in a burdensome and time-consuming process [16], which is not
exempt from disclosure risks [6].
The need of automatic sanitisation/redaction schemes that can
be general enough to be applied to textual documents without
assuming any kind of term structure have been acknowledged in
the past in works like [4,7,8,34]. In these schemes, the idea is to
rely on several semantic analyses that can help to estimate the sen-
sitivity of textual terms in an unsupervised manner, similarly to
what is done by a human expert. To retrieve and analyse term
semantics, different information repositories can be exploited.
More in detail, in [7] the authors provide a practical model of infer-
ence detection using a reference corpus and by considering word
co-occurrences. As the authors acknowledge, inferences extracted
from a large corpus can be used both to assist the document redac-
tion process and to attack redacted outputs. Unfortunately, these
works suffer from two limitations: (i) they only automatize the
redaction process, that is, the detection and removal of sensitive
terms; as a result, either the utility of the protected output will
suffer due to term removal or the supervision of an expert will
be required to propose appropriate generalisations; and (ii) the
automatic method designed to detect sensitive terms relies on a
set of ad-hoc parameters (e.g. absolute number of term
occurrences/co-occurrences) that should be carefully tuned for
each redaction scenario and that lack a sound theoretical
justiﬁcation.
3. Proposal
The goal of the proposed method is to automatically sanitise a
textual medical document according to certain privacyrequirements, which would be usually speciﬁed by current legisla-
tions on medical data privacy; even though, if needed, other
sources of privacy requirements may be incorporated. This will
be done in a way that (i) sensitive elements (deﬁned by the privacy
requirements), and also those apparently innocuous terms than
can effectively re-identify the former by means of semantic infer-
ence, will be sanitised, and (ii) the sanitisation process will try to
preserve the utility of the resulting document as much as possible.
In the following, we call terms to (noun) phrases designating a con-
cept (e.g. AIDS and acquired immune deﬁciency syndrome are terms
referring to the same medical concept).
The general workﬂow of the proposed method is depicted in
Fig. 1. It consists of two preliminary steps (Step-0a and Step-0b)
that take the input privacy requirements (e.g. current legislations)
and automatically set the method parameters; these steps are
expected to be executed only once, just previously to the ﬁrst san-
itisation process. Then, two main steps (Step-1 and Step-2), which
are executed for each document to sanitise, will be in charge of
detecting and protecting sensitive terms and those that are seman-
tically related, according to the input privacy requirements. These
steps are explained in detail in the next subsections.3.1. Step-0a: Obtain the list of sensitive terms
This preliminary step takes as input current legislations on
medical data privacy, such as the U.S. legislation [10,20,37], speci-
fying the kind of entities that should be protected because they are
potentially discriminatory (e.g. AIDS/HIV, mental diseases, Sexu-
ally Transmitted Diseases and drug or alcohol abuse). In any case,
other privacy requirements may also be incorporated. Then, it uses
a knowledge base (KB) to compile a list of terms that will be con-
sidered as sensitive and, thus, should not appear in any publicly
disclosed medical document. We use SNOMED-CT as knowledge
base. SNOMED-CT (Systemized Nomenclature of Medical Clinical
Terms) covers more than 360,000 medical concepts that are taxo-
nomically modelled in 18 partially overlapping hierarchies; indi-
vidual concepts are associated to lists of equivalent terms
(synonyms) [33].
The list of sensitive terms will include the different synonyms
and lexicalisations provided in SNOMED-CT for each entity to pro-
tect (e.g. for STDs: sexually transmitted disease, venereal disease,
VD, etc.) and also all of its taxonomic specialisations, which inherit
the semantics of their –sensitive- ancestors (e.g. for STDs: gonor-
rhoea, syphilis, chlamydia, etc.). Hereinafter, we refer to the result-
ing list of sensitive terms as S. Notice that we do not explicitly
consider the post-coordinated expressions that can be created
from SNOMED-CT concepts to refer to other more complex
concepts. In such cases, we would only refer to the parts of the
expression that are considered as sensitive by the privacy criterion.3.2. Step-0b: Compute the sanitisation threshold
The proposed method relies on the Information Theory and, in
particular, on the notion of Information Content (IC) of textual
terms to automatically guide the sanitisation process. The idea is
to use the notion of IC to quantify the amount of sensitive informa-
tion provided by any of the terms to protect. Given that terms in S
deﬁne the privacy requirements of the sanitisation process, we
assume that the amount of information (IC) they provide states
the baseline amount of sensitive information that should not be
revealed in the protected output in order to avoid disclosure
[30]. As it will be detailed in the following sections, this baseline
will act as sanitisation threshold to decide up to which level sensi-
tive terms should be generalised in the sanitised output to meet
with the privacy requirements and, also, which semantically
Fig. 1. General workﬂow of the proposed method.
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about a sensitive entity.
Numerically, the IC of a term t is computed as the inverse of its
probability of appearance, p(t), in a corpus.
ICðtÞ ¼ log2pðtÞ ð1Þ
In this manner, general terms (e.g. disease) will be assumed to
provide less information than specialised terms (e.g. Chlamydia),
because the former are more likely to be referred in a discourse.
To compute term probabilities, classical methods such as [27]
used tagged textual data as corpora, which provided accurate prob-
abilities when applied to general terms at the cost of manually
compiling and tagging text. However, this approach suffers from
data sparseness when computing the IC of concrete terms (e.g. rare
diseases or speciﬁc medical terms) or recently minted terms (e.g.
names of new drugs), due to the lack of enough data to compute
robust probabilities. In general, the accuracy on the probability cal-
culus and, hence, of the IC assessment, closely depends on the size
and heterogeneity of the corpus used to retrieve term occurrences
[28]. Nowadays, the largest electronic repository is the Web. In
fact, the Web is so large and heterogeneous that it is said to be a
faithful representation of the information distribution at a social
scale [5], an argument that has been supported by recent works
focusing on privacy-protection [7,30–32], which considered the
Web as a realistic proxy for social knowledge. Moreover, thanks
to its dynamicity, the Web covers any possible up-to-date term.
Thus, it constitutes an ideal general-purpose source to compute
realistic IC values.
In order to compute term probabilities from the Web in an efﬁ-
cient manner, several authors [28,39] have used the hit count
returned by aWeb search engine (e.g. Bing, Google) when querying
the term t. In our approach, term probabilities are computed in this
way.
ICWebðtÞ ¼ log2
hitsðtÞ
N
ð2Þwhere N is the number of web resources indexed by the Web search
engine.
By applying the IC calculus to the list of sensitive terms in S, we
can compute the amount of sensitive information they carry out.
Given that our goal is to avoid disclosing any term in S, we can
reformulate this requirement in terms of Information Theory as
avoiding revealing equal or more information about any term in S
than the informativeness of any term in S. This baseline value can
be formulated as a sanitisation threshold s as the IC of the least
informative s e S:
s ¼ min
8s2S
ðICWebðsÞÞ ð3Þ
Notice that, by deﬁnition, s corresponds to the IC of the most
general term in S, which is the one that imposes the stronger
privacy constraint; this is because it deﬁnes the maximum amount
of sensitive information that is allowed to be revealed in the sani-
tised output without incurring in disclosure. The more general the
terms in S are (i.e. the lower their IC and, thus, s), the stricter the
sanitisation becomes because a lower degree of information
disclosure is allowed.
It is worth to mention that, ideally, this step (as well as Step-0a)
will be run the ﬁrst time the system is deployed. After that, recal-
culations should be only needed when the privacy requirements
(i.e. the list of sensitive elements deﬁned by the legislation) or
the medical knowledge base (SNOMED-CT) change.3.3. Step-1: Detect and sanitise sensitive terms
In this step, the system takes as input the medical document to
be sanitised and the list of sensitive terms S. The goal is twofold:
ﬁrst, all the terms of the document that appear in S are detected
and marked as sensitive; after that, the system uses the KB to
sanitise the formerly detected terms by replacing them with suit-
able generalisations.
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the amount of information provided by the term
HIV and by its generalisation Virus.
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and for its textual content, our method uses several natural lan-
guage processing tools to detect sensitive terms. Speciﬁcally,
because sensitive terms are those referring to concepts or instances
and these are referred in text by means of nouns or, more gener-
ally, noun phrases (NPs) [30], we focus on the detection of NPs.
To detect NPs we use several natural language tools (OpenNLP2)
performing sentence detection, tokenisation (i.e. word detection,
including contraction separation), part-of-speech tagging (POS) and
syntactic parsing of input text. As a result of this process, POS-tagged
words are put together according to their role, by obtaining, among
others, the noun phrases (NPs). Once NPs are detected, those that
contain any of the terms in S are marked as sensitive. Hereinafter
we refer to this set of elements as T. To improve the recall of this
matching process with regard to the different morphological
derivations of the same word (e.g. singular/plural forms), a stem-
ming algorithm [26] is applied both to the terms in S and to the
words of the NP. Notice that linguistic parsing is language-
dependant; thus, linguistic tools appropriate for the language in
which the input document is written are needed. Currently, natural
language processing tools such as OpenNLP support many different
languages, including English, German, Spanish and Portuguese.
Afterwards, terms t in T should be protected in a way that they
do not disclose sensitive information or, more desirably, that the
amount of sensitive information they disclose is low enough. The
latter approach is better suited to retain the utility of the protected
data, for which the optimal sanitisation is such that protects sensi-
tive information while minimising information loss. To do so,
terms t in T are substituted by generalisations g(t) (e.g.
t = HIV? g(t) = Virus), which are extracted from the KB. In this
manner, the sanitised document still retains part of its semantics
and, hence, a degree of utility.
To select the appropriate generalisation with respect to disclo-
sure risk and data utility, we employ an information theoretic
approach [30]. More speciﬁcally, this step uses the sanitisation
threshold s to guarantee that any generalisation g(t) proposed as
replacement of any t discloses less information than s. As
explained in the previous section, this threshold is a numerical
value that represents the amount of information provided by the
least informative element in S. In this way, the system ensures that
any valid generalisation discloses less information than any of the
elements to protect. To do so, the hierarchy of generalisations of
each sensitive term t, H = h1?   ? hl, is obtained from the KB.
The optimal generalisation g(t) (from the data utility point of view)
will be such that provides the maximum information while fulﬁll-
ing s.
gðtÞ ¼ arg max
8hj2HjICWebðhjÞ<s
ðICWebðhjÞÞ ð4Þ
The large and detailed taxonomic structure of SNOMED-CT is
especially suited for this purpose, because generalisation steps
are ﬁne grained, and this allows retrieving generalisations that
accurately ﬁt the sanitisation criterion (i.e. fulﬁlling the threshold
but retaining maximum information).
Fig. 2 illustrates this process. The large white circle represents
the IC of a sensitive term t = HIV found in the input document. By
looking at the generalisation hierarchy provided by SNOMED-CT
for the term HIV, we obtain: HIV? Lentivirus? Retroviri-
dae? Retro-transcribing Virus? Virus?Microorganism? Organ-
ism. Assuming that Virus is the ﬁrst generalisation to fulﬁl the
sanitisation threshold s, the term HIV will be replaced in the sani-
tised document by Virus, whose IC is represented in grey. Notice
that, by deﬁnition of the taxonomical subsumption [27], the infor-
mativeness of a term generalisation constitutes a strict subset of2 http://opennlp.apache.org/ (last accessed: November, 2013).the informativeness of the term, because the former strictly sub-
sumes the semantics of the latter. In this way, the sanitisation pro-
cess decreases the amount of disclosed information to fulﬁl the
privacy criterion, while retaining a degree of utility that, in this
example, speciﬁcally corresponds to the area of the grey circle.
The output of Step-1 is a preliminary sanitised document that
contains the terms marked as sensitive and their suitable
generalisations.
3.4. Step-2: Detect and sanitise risky related terms
With the previous step, sensitive terms are analysed and
detected independently, which is similar to what is done in many
sanitisers [13,23,30,35,40]. For example, when sanitising Sexually
Transmitted Diseases (STD) from a document, the term Chlamydia
will be marked as sensitive because it is a specialisation of STD
(according to SNOMED-CT) whereas other terms that are not spe-
cialisations like sexual contact or genitals will remain in clear form.
However, these last terms are highly related with STD and they
may enable its re-identiﬁcation by means of semantic inference
[34]. In fact, most terms appearing in a discourse are semantically
related up to a degree [1] and, thus, they may negate sanitisation
efforts in which terms are managed independently.
To tackle this problem, we incorporate the ﬁnal sanitisation
step (Step-2), in which terms that were not found to be sensitive
in the previous step, but that may disclose any of the already
detected ones, are also protected. In order to achieve this, we rely
on an information theoretic estimation of the risk of disclosing sen-
sitive terms [31] due to the presence, in the same document, of
semantically related ones, which can be strictly medical or not.
Hereinafter we refer to each of these related terms as q.
According to [31], the disclosure risk (DR) that a semantically
related term q causes with regard to a sensitive term t can be esti-
mated according to the amount of information that q reveals about
t. In terms of Information Theory this can be measured as the
Mutual Information (MI) of two variables. The instantiation of the
MI for two speciﬁc values (q and t, in this case) corresponds to their
Point-wise Mutual Information (PMI) [9].
DRðt; qÞ ¼ PMIðt; qÞ ¼ log2
pðt; qÞ
pðtÞpðqÞ ð5Þ
Numerically, if t and q are completely independent (i.e. they co-
occur in a textual context just by chance), their PMI is 0 and, thus,
there is no disclosure risk for t with regard to q (i.e. DR(t;q) = 0).
This means that the presence of q in a document does not provide
any particular evidence of t. On the other hand, positive PMI values
reﬂect the amount of information of t disclosed by the presence of q.
Particularly, if whenever q occurs, t also occurs, then p(t,q) = p(q)
and, thus, their PMI is equal to the amount of information provided
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risk because the presence of q completely discloses t.
In the same way as in the previous section, PMI probabilities
can be computed from the Web hit count provided by a Web
search engine:
PMIWebðt; qÞ ¼ log2
hitsðp AND qÞ
N
hitsðtÞ
N  hitsðqÞN
ð6Þ
The characterisation of disclosure risk presented in Eq. (5) assumes
that all the information that an attacker may gather about t is given
by q, that is, t is assumed to be removed in the output document.
However, since in our approach the terms t are replaced by gener-
alisations g(t), rather than removed, the presence of g(t) in the san-
itised output provides additional information about t that would
produce a higher risk of disclosure.
Fig. 3 illustrates this scenario following to the sanitisation pro-
cess depicted in Fig. 2, in which the sensitive term t = HIV was
replaced by the less informative generalisation g(t) = Virus, so that
the information that remains in the output about HIV is IC(Virus),
which is shown in grey. In Fig. 3, the term q = Infected immune cells,
which was left in clear form in the ﬁrst step, is also considered.
Given that t = HIV and q = Infected immune cells are semantically
related and, thus, they have a tendency to co-occur, q = Infected
immune cells is revealing an amount of information about t = HIV
that speciﬁcally corresponds to PMI(HIV; Infected immune cells),
which is also represented in grey. Thus, the real disclosure of
t = HIV is, in this case, the result of the union of the information
given by g(t) = Virus and the information that q = Infected immune
cells is revealing about t = HIV, that is,DR = PMI(t;q) + IC(g(t)), which
corresponds to the whole grey area in Fig. 3. Moreover, in the same
manner as q = Infected immune cells is revealing some information
about t = HIV, it is also likely to reveal information about g(t) = Virus,
which corresponds to PMI(Virus; Infected immune cells). In order to
not to count this amount of information twice, which is represented
in the ﬁgure as the darker grey area that corresponds to the overlap
between IC(Virus) and PMI(HIV; Infected immune cells), we should
subtract PMI(g(t);q) from the ﬁnal expression of DR.
Given the above discussion, the ﬁnal DR expression that consid-
ers the fact that sensitive terms t are replaced by generalisations
g(t) and also the presence of semantically related terms q is the
following:
DRðt; qÞ ¼ PMIðt; qÞ þ ICðgðtÞÞ  PMIðgðtÞ; qÞ ð7Þ
In the same manner as in the previous step, a threshold for DR val-
ues should be deﬁned, both to detect which semantically relatedFig. 3. Graphical representation of the disclosure risk caused by the presence of the
semantically related term Infected immune cells with respect to the sensitive term
HIV and its generalisation Virus.terms produce too much disclosure and, if that is the case, up to
which level those should be protected (i.e. sanitised). Given that
the threshold s (see Eq. (3)) quantiﬁes the baseline amount of infor-
mation that should not be revealed about the entities to protect, any
q that, in addition to g(t), reveals equal or more information than s
about any t will be considered as risky.
Like in the previous step, in order to preserve the utility of the
output as much as possible, those q found to be risky will be
replaced by appropriate generalisations g(q) that provide the max-
imum information (IC(g(q))) while fulﬁlling the privacy require-
ments stated by s, that is DR(t;g(q)) < s. Moreover, given that the
same qmay disclose different amounts of information for each sen-
sitive term t in T, its generalisation should be such that the privacy
criterion is fulﬁlled for all t in T. To do so, a knowledge base is que-
ried to retrieve the set of generalisations of q (H = h1?   ? hl)
and the most appropriate one, by considering all t in T, is taken:
gðqÞ ¼ arg max
8hj2HjDRðti ;hjÞ<s
ðICWebðhjÞÞ 8ti 2 T ð8Þ
It is worth to mention that, given that semantically related
terms q may or may not correspond to medical concepts, general
knowledge structures covering domains other than the medical
one will be needed to retrieve generalisations. In our case, we
use the taxonomies provided by WordNet [14], an structured the-
sauri covering more than 100,000 concepts, and ODP (Open Direc-
tory Service), whose taxonomy structures web resources in more
than 1,000,000 categories, in addition to SNOMED-CT. In case of
overlap (i.e. a term which is contained in several knowledge bases),
the strict order is (i) SNOMED-CT, (ii) WordNet and (iii) ODP,
because the former provide a more detailed structuring of medical
concepts. Only in such cases in which q is not found in any knowl-
edge base, it will be removed from the output.
Following the graphical example used above, Fig. 4 shows the
reduction of disclosure risk resulting from the sanitisation of the
semantically related term q = Infected immune cells with regard to
the sensitive one t = HIV. In this case, assume that the generalisa-
tion retrieved from SNOMED-CT of q = Infected immune cells that
fulﬁls the privacy criterion (Eq. (8)) is g(q) = Cells. Since IC(Cells)
is a strict subset of IC(Infected immune cells), its information disclo-
sure about t = HIV (i.e. the grey area corresponding to PMI(HIV;
Cells)) is also smaller than for the original q = Infected immune cells
(see the grey area that corresponds to PMI(HIV; Infected immune
cells) in Fig. 3). As a result, the total disclosure (union of greyed
areas) is also smaller than in Fig. 3, even though an amount of
information/utility about q is still preserved in the output, which
strictly corresponds to IC(Cells).Fig. 4. Graphical representation of the disclosure risk reduction (with respect to
HIV) resulting from the replacement of Infected immune cells by its generalisation
Cells.
D. Sánchez et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 52 (2014) 189–198 195Notice also that the disclosure of a certain t (e.g. HIV) may also
happen because of the combination of several terms {q1, . . . ,qp} (e.g.
sexual transmission, immune system, etc.), even if each qi did not
caused disclosure individually. In such cases, the above method
can be extended to evaluate the disclosure risk of t with regard
to a set {q1, . . . ,qp} and to generalise the elements of the set until
the threshold s is fulﬁlled. To do so, the PMI of the term t with
regard to a set {q1, . . . ,qp} can be computed as follows:
PMIðt; fq1; . . . ; qpgÞ ¼¼ log2
pðt; q1; . . . ; qpÞ
pðtÞpðq1; . . . ; qpÞ
ð9Þ
As a result of this process, the ﬁnal sanitised document is
obtained in which both sensitive terms and those semantically
related ones that were found to be risky are sanitised.3 http://www.bing.com/.3.5. Step-2: Tackling language ambiguity
In Section 3.2 we argued about the suitability of using the Web
as general corpora for the probability calculus needed for IC/PMI
assessments, and of using Web Search Engines (WSEs) as proxies
to obtain these probabilities. However, probabilities of sensitive
entities computed from the number of explicit occurrences of
terms referring to them, that is, the hit count provided by the
WSE when querying the terms, may be negatively inﬂuenced by
language ambiguity. Speciﬁcally, when the words used to refer an
entity are polysemic (e.g. crabs can refer to a sexually transmitted
disease or to a crustacean), the probability computed from the
web hit count may overestimate the probability of the underling
concept (e.g. crabs as a STD), because the web hit count includes
all the appearances of the word, regardless of their meanings; thus,
the entity will be considered as less informative than what it truly
is. Likewise, if an entity can be referred by means of different
synonyms (e.g. the terms HIV and human immunodeﬁciency virus
refer to the same disease) or entities referred in a discourse are
not explicitly mentioned in text due to ellipsis, the resulting
probabilities will be lower than expected and, thus, the entity
informativeness will be overestimated.
On the one hand, probability inaccuracies caused by synonymy
can be minimised by obtaining the synonyms of each entity to be
protected from SNOMED-CT, as it was stated in Section 3.1. On
the other hand, to tackle the problems caused by polysemy and
to minimise the effect of ellipsis, a suitable solution consists on
contextualising WSE term queries within the scope of one of the
term’s generalisations (e.g. crabs AND STD), as proposed in [28].
The main idea is that, by forcing the co-occurrence of a term refer-
ring to an entity (e.g. crabs, as a type of STD) and the generalisation
that is adequate to the meaning of the entity (e.g. STD), the effect of
polysemy in the resulting hit count is minimised. This is because
words rarely refer to different senses within the same document:
if crabs and sexually transmitted disease appears together it is very
likely that the crabs appearance does not refer to a crustacean.
Likewise, since only explicit co-occurrences of terms and their gen-
eralisations are considered, the potential ellipses of the latter are
omitted from the probability assessment. This contributes to
improve the coherence of the IC assessment, that is, the fact that
the informativeness of a generalisation should be a strict subset
of the informativeness of its specialisation [27], as stated in Sec-
tion 3.3. Thus, query contextualisation enables a more accurate
probability assessment [28]. The downside is the fact that the
explicit contextualisation of term occurrences constraints the size
of the corpora considered in the probability calculus. However, the
size and redundancy of theWeb helps to minimise the effect of this
handicap, which, in any case, is preferable to the negative inﬂuence
of language ambiguity [28].To contextualise the hit count resulting from term queries per-
formed to the WSE, the generalisation will be attached to the term
using a logic operator supported by the WSE, such as AND or +. We
have applied this procedure to the queries evaluating the disclosure
risk of t in T during Step-2. In this manner, the detection and saniti-
sation of related terms qwill be less affected by the ambiguity asso-
ciated to the evaluated t. Thus,whenever a sensitive entity is queried
to the WSE to compute IC and PMI, its generalisation will be
attached. Since this generalisation is retrieved from SNOMED-CT,
we can be sure that it will correspond to the appropriate meaning
of the entity, thus enabling the desired disambiguation (e.g. the gen-
eralisation of crabs retrieved from SNOMED-CTwill refer to a type of
STD). As stated above, this contextualisation is considered when
querying t in the expression of DR (Eq. (7)):
DRðt; qÞ ¼ PMIWebðt AND gðtÞ; qÞ þ ICWebðgðtÞÞ
 PMIWebðgðtÞ; qÞ ð10Þ
where PMIWeb(t AND g(t);q) is computed as follows:
PMIWebðt AND gðtÞ; qÞ ¼ log2
hitsðt AND gðtÞ AND qÞ
N
hitsðt AND gðtÞÞ
N  hitsðqÞN
ð11Þ
The contextualisation is also considered in the expression comput-
ing the threshold s from the sensitive entities s in S (Eq. (3)):
s ¼ min
8s2S
ðICWebðs AND gðsÞÞÞ ð12Þ
where ICWeb(s AND g(s)) is computed as follows:
ICWebðs AND gðsÞÞ ¼ log2
hitsðs AND gðsÞÞ
N
ð13Þ
In this last equation g(s) corresponds to the most speciﬁc gener-
alisation of s that fulﬁls IC(g(s)) < IC(s).4. Evaluation
To simulate and evaluate the protection that our system would
be able to achieve for textual medical documents (e.g. electronic
healthcare records), we used the Wikipedia descriptions of the set
of medical entities that are considered as sensitive by U.S. state
and federal laws [10,20]. As stated in the introduction, these legisla-
tions mandate hospitals and healthcare organisations to redact
some medical-related concepts that are considered of conﬁdential
nature before releasing patient records to, for example, insurance
companies, in response toWorker’s Compensation orMotor Vehicle
Accident claims, or a judge, in case ofmalpractice litigation [4]. Usu-
ally, all references to potentially discriminating conditions like alco-
hol and substance abuse, Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD),
mental diseases or HIV/AIDS status should be redacted/sanitised.
All these terms were feed as the input to our method in order to
obtain the list of sensitive terms S from SNOMED-CT (Step-0a) and
to compute the sanitisation threshold (Step-0b). A total of 6Wikipe-
dia articles each one describing the main entities from a medical
perspective were taken: STD, HIV, AIDS, Mental disorder, Alcohol
abuse and Substance abuse. As done in other works [7,30,34], Wiki-
pedia descriptionswere chosen as representatives of the kind of tex-
tual information that could be found in healthcare records due to
being freely accessible and authoritative sources of information,
and also because of their high informativeness and tight discourses,
which conﬁgure a challenging scenario from the perspective of doc-
ument redacting/sanitisation. SNOMED-CT,WordNet andODPwere
used to retrieve term generalisations and Bing3 was employed as the
Web search engine to obtain term hit counts for probability calculus.
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over an Intel Core2 Quad 2.66 GHz with 4 GB RAM, Windows 7
and a 100 Mb Internet connection. The average runtime for the
sanitisation of the six Wikipedia sources was 16.7 min. Note that
most of the runtime is devoted to perform queries to Web search
engines and to wait for the results, but this waiting periods are
highly parallelisable.
4.1. Detection accuracy
First, we evaluated the detection accuracy of sensitive and
related terms. To do so, two human experts were requested to
manually sanitise each Wikipedia article with the aim of detecting
terms that, under their opinion, may help to disclose any of the
entities stated as sensitive (i.e. STD, HIV, AIDS,Mental disorder, Alco-
hol abuse and Substance abuse). The initial inter-agreement was
0.88; however, they were requested to agree on the differences
to obtain consensual results to which evaluate our method. By
comparing the outputs of the automatic and manual detection pro-
cedures, precision, recall and F-measure can be measured.Precision
quantiﬁes the proportion of sensitive terms identiﬁed by our
method that have also been identiﬁed by the human experts. The
lower the precision is and, thus, the better the utility of the pro-
tected output will be because a lower amount of terms will be
unnecessarily redacted or sanitised.
Precision ¼ jMethod \ HumanjjMethodj  100 ð14Þ
Recall quantiﬁes the proportion of sensitive terms identiﬁed by the
human experts that our method has been also able to identify. Thus,
the higher the recall is, the higher the privacy of the output will be.
In document redaction/sanitisation, recall usually plays a more
important role than precision because a low recall implies disclos-
ing data that may negate the whole sanitisation [1].
Recall ¼ jMethod \ HumanjjHumanj  100 ð15Þ
Finally F-measure provides the harmonic mean of precision and
recall and, thus, summarises the accuracy of the detection process.
F-measure ¼ 2 Recall Precision
Recallþ Precision ð16ÞTable 1
Evaluation of sensitive terms detected only by the ﬁrst step of the proposed method.
Wikipedia article Precision (%) Recall (%) F-measure (%)
STD 100 9.52 17.38
HIV 100 12 21.43
AIDS 100 5.88 11.11
Mental disorder 100 17.39 29.63
Alcohol abuse 100 28.57 44.44
Substance abuse 100 6.97 13.03
Average 100 13.38 22.84
Table 2
Evaluation of sensitive terms detected by the whole method with contextualised and non
Wikipedia article Precision Recall
No context (%) Context (%) No con
STD 50.06 66.66 100
HIV 75.6 85.71 100
AIDS 50.08 75.6 91.17
Mental disorder 46.93 82.14 92
Alcohol abuse 51.61 66.66 100
Substance abuse 52.94 75 94.73
Average 54.54 75.29 96.31In the ﬁrst experiment, as done in many methods
[13,29,30,35,40], we did not considered semantically related terms,
that is, we solely applied the ﬁrst step of the proposed method.
Evaluation results are shown in Table 1.
Since the detection process of Step-1 just looks for sensitive
terms and for their taxonomic specialisations (retrieved from
SNOMED-CT), a large number of risky terms that are semantically
related (other than taxonomically) with the entities to protect are
left in clear. Indeed, since Wikipedia articles usually present a tight
focus on the described entity, most of the terms they contain are
semantically related to the entity to protect [31,32]. These results
illustrate the importance of considering semantic relationships in
document redaction/sanitisation and how an independent evalua-
tion of terms is usually not enough to achieve enough protection in
front of semantic inferences [1]. On the other hand, given that
terms detected as sensitive are extracted from SNOMED-CT unam-
biguously, precision is perfect in all cases.
In the second test, the whole methodwas applied, which detects
both sensitive terms and those that are semantically related. Given
that the detection criteria of the second step depends on how prob-
abilities are computed, we performed two runs for each article: one
using the basic probability calculus and another one with the con-
textualised version proposed in Section 3.5 to minimise language
ambiguity. Evaluation results are depicted in Table 2.
Recall ﬁgures in this second experiment are noticeably higher
than those of the ﬁrst due to the evaluation of semantically related
terms (93–96% vs. 13.4%, in average). This is especially relevant
given that recall ﬁgures directly measure the degree of privacy
achieved in the output. It is interesting that, in around half of the
cases, the recall reached a 100%. This suggests that the outputs
are perfectly valid in a real setting.
Precision, on the other hand, is lower than in the previous
experiment (54–75% vs. 100%, in average). This is caused by the
larger number of false positives that result from the imperfections
of the automatic assessment and, especially, of the probability cal-
culus. In fact, we observe noticeable differences between contex-
tualised on non-contextualised versions of the probability
calculus. In the former case, precision is noticeably higher (75.3%
vs. 54.5%, in average), which suggests that:
– The non-contextualised term probabilities resulted in a too
strict sanitisation, that is, too many terms were unnecessarily
sanitised, which is reﬂected in the lower precision. This was
either because the baseline informativeness used as threshold
was underestimated, or because the amount of information dis-
closure caused by related terms regarding the sensitive ones
were overestimated.
– The procedure applied to minimise language ambiguity in the
probability calculus (that is, polysemy and ellipsis) had a posi-
tive contribution in enabling a more precise detection, even
when causing a slightly decrease in recall (93.45% vs. 96.31%).
– As a result, the global accuracy (i.e. F-measure) of the detection
process with contextualised probabilities signiﬁcantly sur-
passes that of its non-contextualised version (83% vs. 69.3%, in-contextualised versions of the probability calculus.
F-measure
text (%) Context (%) No context (%) Context (%)
97.56 66.72 79.20
100 86.105 92.30
91.17 64.65 82.66
85.18 62.15 83.63
100 68.08 79.99
86.84 67.92 80.49
93.45 69.27 83.05
Table 3
Utility preservation according to the different redaction/sanitisation strategies.
Wikipedia article Step-1: removal (%) Step-1: generalisation (%) Steps-1 & 2: removal Steps-1 & 2: generalisation
No context (%) Context (%) No context (%) Context (%)
STD 93.75 96.76 30.11 39.34 35.88 74.69
HIV 90.93 97.97 10.49 14.13 24.24 71.89
AIDS 93.15 98.87 21.30 39.27 29.88 78.21
Mental disorder 91.61 96.33 32.44 50.54 46.19 81.11
Alcohol abuse 83.56 93.55 8.04 20.10 14.58 63.65
Substance abuse 96.21 98.73 25.19 43.41 38.41 75.27
Average 91.53 97.o03 21.26 34.46 31.53 74.13
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capture the informativeness and information disclosure of sen-
sitive entities and related terms, respectively.
4.2. Utility evaluation
The second part of the evaluation quantiﬁes the amount of util-
ity that the protected output preserves with regard to the input
document, and compares our method with different redaction/san-
itisation strategies.
To measure the degree of utility preservation we ﬁrst quantify
the utility of a document as the sum of the amount of information
provided by all the terms w appearing in a document D (i.e., noun
phrases detected by means of the syntactic parsing, regardless of
being latterly identiﬁed as sensitive or not).
ICðDÞ ¼
X
8w2D
ICðwÞ ð17Þ
Then, the degree of utility preservation of the sanitised docu-
ment D0 is measured as the ratio between the utility of D0 and of
the original version D [30], as follows:
UtilityðD0Þ ¼ ICðD
0Þ
ICðDÞ  100 ð18Þ
Utility ﬁgures are shown in Table 3. In order to put them into con-
text, the following redaction/sanitisation strategies have been
implemented:
– Only those terms detected as sensitive in the Step-1 of the
method are protected. This is done in two ways: (i) term
removal (i.e. redacting), as in [13,35,40], and (ii) term generalisa-
tion (i.e. sanitisation) according to the privacy criteria, as in [30].
– All terms detected by the whole method (Step-1 and 2) are pro-
tected either by: (i) term removal, as done in [31], and (ii) term
generalisation, as proposed by our method. Given that Step-2
depends on the probability calculus used to detect and general-
ise terms, we include the results with the basic probability
assessment and with the contextualised version proposed in
Section 3.5.
Utility ﬁgures obtained when only the ﬁrst step of the method is
applied are coherent with the low recall ﬁgures reported in Table 1.
Given that the individual analysis of terms omits a large number of
semantically related ones (which are left in clear form), utility pres-
ervation is very high (above 90%), at the cost of a very low privacy
protection (recall below 14% in average, as shown in Table 1). Obvi-
ously, the generalisation of sensitive terms preserves a larger
amount of information than the straightforward term removal
(97% vs. 91.5%, in average). This illustrates the advantages of the
exploitation of a knowledge base to improve the utility of the
protected output.
Utility preservation is signiﬁcantly lower when both sensitive
and semantically related terms are protected (Step-1 and 2). This
suggests that a large percentage of terms appearing in the input
document were indeed semantically related to the entities to beprotected, which is coherent with the tight discourses that charac-
terise Wikipedia articles. These results are also coherent with the
near-perfect recall reported in Table 2, which suggests that most
of the risky terms where properly identiﬁed and protected. Thus,
the observed differences in utility preservation quantify the cost
derived from the protection of risky related terms, that is, the cost
of the more robust privacy guarantees.
There are, however, noticeable differences between the speciﬁc
protection method and the probability calculus. First, the strategy
based on term generalisation preserves around 100% more utility
(34.5% vs. 21.3% for non-contextualised probabilities and 74.1%
vs. 31.5% for contextualised probabilities, in average) than the
one performing term removal. In fact, ﬁgures obtained by pure
redaction (i.e. removal) suggest that the protected outputs would
be hardly usable for human readers and also for data analysis.
Moreover, the contextualisation of the probability calculus adds a
comparable degree of utility improvement over the baseline pro-
tection strategy (31.5% vs. 21.7% for pure redaction and 74.1% vs.
34.5% for term sanitisation, in average). In this latter case, the
observed improvement is motivated by:
– The number of false positives that are unnecessarily redacted/
sanitised in Step-2 is signiﬁcantly lower when using contextua-
lised probabilities, as suggested by the precision ﬁgures reported
in Table 2. Thus, the utility of the protected outputwill be notice-
ably higher thanks to the more accurate detection process.
– As argued in Section 3.5, term ambiguity (i.e. polysemy and ellip-
sis) is minimised when using contextualised probabilities. Given
that this ambiguity tends to underestimate baseline IC values
and, thus, to force the method to replace terms by more abstract
generalisations to fulﬁl the privacy criterion (i.e. those with
lower IC), unambiguous probabilities contribute to retrievemore
accurate and, thus, more utility-preserving generalisations.
At the end, utility ﬁgures obtained by our complete method
(Step-1 and 2, with contextualised probabilities and term general-
isations) are just a 17–23% lower than baseline approaches that do
not consider semantic relationships (74% vs. 91.5–97%, in average),
while providing much more robust privacy guarantees (93.5% vs.
13.4% of average term recall, as reported in Tables 1 and 2).
5. Conclusions
This paper presents an automatic method to sanitise textual
medical data. Several aspects differentiate it from related works.
First, several knowledge bases are exploited to retain, as much as
possible, the semantics and, thus, the analytical utility and
readability of the protected output. Second, on the contrary to
methods focusing on speciﬁc types of sensitive entities (like e-mail
addresses or social security numbers) [2,3,13,15,17–19,25,35,36,
40,41], our approach does not make any assumptions on the struc-
ture of the terms to protect. As a result, it in can be applied to tex-
tual contents regardless the fact that terms (e.g. diseases,
symptoms, treatment, etc.) present or not a regular structure.
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ence of semantically related terms, which is especially critical in
the medical context in which most terms appearing in a document
are likely to be semantically related up to some degree.
To achieve those goals, the proposed method builds on an infor-
mation theoretic characterisation of term sensitiveness and disclo-
sure risk [30–32] and an accurate calculus of term probabilities
from the Web. The fact that the privacy criterion can be deﬁned
by simply listing the set of entities that should be considered as sen-
sitivemakes our approach intuitive (from the perspective of the pri-
vacy guarantees that one may expect from the protected output),
and especially suitable to be applied in coherency with legislations
on medical data privacy, which are speciﬁed in the same manner.
The evaluation showed that: (i) the analysis of semantically
related terms, (ii) the contextualisation of probability queries and
(iii) the replacement (instead of removal) of sensitive terms by
appropriate generalisations improved the detection recall of sensi-
tive information (i.e. the practical privacy of the output) while con-
tributing to preserve the output’s utility.
As future work, we plan to improve and extend the linguistic
analysis of texts by incorporating other terms that may cause dis-
closure (e.g. verbs in sentences like ‘‘he drinks too much’’). Ontol-
ogies modelling verbs such as WordNet could be used to assist the
sanitisation process. A deeper linguistic analysis may also contrib-
ute to improve the accuracy by detecting negated assertions (e.g.
‘‘AIDS negative’’) and thus avoiding unnecessary sanitisations. Fur-
ther tests will be also performed with sources written in different
languages in order to illustrate the applicability of our method
given the availability of linguistic parsing tools for such languages.
Finally, experiments with real medical data, which is the focus of
our system, are also planned.
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